Computer Direct and other foreign direct purchasers would be unable to do that, however, because foreign conduct, independent of any effect on American commerce, caused their harm. 10 7. Section 4 of the Clayton Act permits plaintiffs to recover treble damages (three times the actual damages) and attorney's fees. 15 U.S.C. § 15(a).
Although there were effects on American commerce, these effects (increased prices in the United States) were not the cause of Computer Direct's antitrust injury-"[r]ather, it was the foreign effects of the price fixing scheme (increased prices abroad)."
8. Id. § 6a. The FTAIA creates a general rule that the antitrust laws (specifically, 15 U.S.C. § § 1-7, the Sherman Act) "shall not apply to conduct involving trade or commerce (other than import trade or import commerce) with foreign nations," and then establishes exceptions to that rule. Id. § 6a. To bring a lawsuit under an exception, Computer Direct would have to show that Mono Polly's actions had "a direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect" on American commerce, and that such effect "gives rise to a claim" and antitrust injury (such as illegal price fixing and a reduction in competition) under the antitrust laws. Id.; see also infra Section I.B. 11. In re Monosodium Glutamate Antitrust Litig., 477 F.3d 535, 539-40 (8th Cir. 2007); see also In re Dynamic Random Access Memory (DRAM) Antitrust Litig., 546 F.3d 981, 989 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that increases in American prices must proximately cause the plaintiff's foreign injury); In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 702 F. Supp. 2d 548, 555 (E.D. Pa. 2010) (referring to the proximate cause analysis under the FTAIA as a "serial process" in which the domestic effect happens first and the foreign antitrust claim comes after and because of the domestic effect).
[ Vol. 114:309 This hypothetical implicates two major issues in federal antitrust law: indirect purchaser standing 12 and the application of U.S. antitrust laws to foreign conduct. Indirect purchaser standing evolved from an interpretation of section 4 of the Clayton Act. 13 Section 4 permits any "person . . . injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws" to bring suit to recover treble damages (amounting to three times actual compensatory damages) for antitrust violations. 14 In Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp. 15 and Illinois Brick Co. v . Illinois, 16 the Supreme Court generally limited the definition of such persons to direct purchasers, thereby denying indirect purchasers standing to sue for monetary damages under section 4. 17 American scholars and states alike have intensely criticized this standing requirement-but it still applies to federal antitrust claims. 18 The direct purchaser rule is not absolute, however; many exceptions have evolved since the Court decided Illinois Brick in 1977. 19 When one of these exceptions applies, indirect purchasers may be permitted to sue. Although there are many exceptions to the direct purchaser rule with varying degrees of judicial acceptance, this Note focuses on two that are particularly relevant in the FTAIA context: (1) when a direct purchaser is owned or controlled by its supplier (the "defendant control exception"), and (2) when the direct purchaser conspires with its supplier in violation of antitrust laws (the co-conspirator exception).
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While the direct purchaser rule is relatively straightforward, the international frame of the hypothetical complicates the application of U.S. antitrust law. Almost every product in modern America takes a transnational route to 12. This Note refers to the rule that precludes indirect purchasers from suing under section 4 of the Clayton Act interchangeably as "indirect purchaser standing," the "direct purchaser rule," and the "Illinois Brick doctrine" (referring to Ill. Brick Co. v 20. I discuss these exceptions in detail infra in Part II. See infra Section I.A for a discussion of many additional exceptions. its final destination. 21 Like Mono Polly's speakers, many of these international goods are exposed to overseas antitrust activities. 22 In 1982, Congress enacted the FTAIA to resolve uncertainties about the "scope and effect" of U.S. antitrust laws over foreign conduct. 23 The FTAIA exempts all foreign nonimport commercial activity from the application of the antitrust laws 24 unless two conditions are met: (1) the activity sufficiently impacted American commerce, and (2) the impact on American commerce caused the plaintiff's antitrust injury. 25 40 Part I lays the groundwork for the subsequent discussions of the FTAIA and standing in antitrust law. Part II argues that the defendant control and co-conspirator exceptions to the direct purchaser rule are as valid as the textual exceptions recognized in Illinois Brick because they satisfy Illinois Brick's major policy rationales. Additionally, refusing to apply these exceptions when antitrust conduct occurs overseas effectively insulates foreign antitrust violators who target American consumers from civil liability simply because they have conspired with (or commanded) foreign direct purchasers to act as intermediaries. Part III argues that, assuming that Illinois Brick poses no bar, courts should interpret the FTAIA to allow indirect purchaser standing and interpret Motorola II to permit exceptions to the direct purchaser rule in the FTAIA context.
I. Antitrust Standing Under the FTAIA
In the United States, individuals can bring lawsuits for antitrust violations only when they satisfy the requirements of antitrust standing. 41 Section 4 of the Clayton Act governs private plaintiff standing for civil complainants seeking to recover treble damages. 42 When anticompetitive conduct occurs in export or purely foreign commerce, however, plaintiffs must also satisfy the requirements of the FTAIA. Section I.A briefly covers the federal standards for establishing private plaintiff standing in antitrust law. Section I.B identifies the overlap between antitrust standing generally and the requirements under the FTAIA. 
A. Private Plaintiff Standing in Antitrust Law
To sue for treble damages under section 4 of the Clayton Act, private plaintiffs must show they have been "injured in [their] business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws." 43 The Supreme Court has interpreted this language to require that plaintiffs show they suffered an antitrust injury and are the correct "persons" to bring the suit. 44 First, plaintiffs must show they sustained an "antitrust injury" that Congress meant the antitrust laws to prevent. 45 This injury-in-fact must also be directly linked to the antitrust activity. 46 Courts also consider the remoteness of the claim, the speculative nature of the damages, and if denying standing would result in major antitrust activities going "undetected or unremedied" to determine whether the plaintiffs are the best enforcers of the antitrust laws. 47 A plaintiff must then show that the alleged antitrust violation was a material cause of the injury.
48
Private plaintiffs must also show that they are the correct "persons" to bring the antitrust suit. 49 Except in limited circumstances, the direct purchaser rule prevents indirect purchasers from suing violators of antitrust laws for treble damages. 50 The Supreme Court established the direct purchaser rule in two steps: Hanover Shoe 51 and Illinois Brick. 52 In Kansas v. UtiliCorp United Inc., the Court reaffirmed the doctrine.
53
Hanover Shoe established the principle that antitrust defendants cannot strip direct purchasers of standing by showing that a direct purchaser has passed on the overcharge to indirect purchasers. 54 When anticompetitive conditions increase prices for direct purchasers, direct purchasers often pass on at least some of the cost to their own customers. 55 In Hanover Shoe, the 55. See supra note 4 and accompanying text for a description of how the pass-on effect fits in with the motivating hypothetical. Although indirect purchasers are ultimately harmed plaintiffs alleged that the defendants had "monopolized the shoe machinery industry" in violation of the antitrust laws. 56 The defendants, however, tried to use a " 'passing-on' defense" and claimed that the plaintiff "suffered no legally cognizable injury . . . [because] the illegal overcharge . . . was reflected in the price charged for shoes" that were sold by the plaintiff. 57 The Supreme Court rejected this defense in part due to the complexity of determining the various causes of price changes and the impact those changes have on sales.
58
The Court also considered the absence of incentives for "ultimate consumers" to bring antitrust class action lawsuits: direct purchasers with more money at stake could more efficiently enforce the antitrust laws.
59
Illinois Brick expanded the holding in Hanover Shoe, generally prohibiting the use of the pass-on theory to establish indirect purchaser standing.
60
In Illinois Brick the plaintiffs (the state of Illinois and others) were "indirect purchasers of concrete block" from the defendant. 61 The defendant had sold concrete to masonry contractors, who submitted bids to general contractors that in turn served the plaintiffs. 62 The plaintiffs argued they had standing because the direct purchasers (the various contractors) had passed on the overcharge, injuring them. 63 Although the Court recognized that the plaintiffs might have been harmed, the Court held that Hanover Shoe limited standing to direct purchasers who had been overcharged, excluding others in manufacturing or the distribution chain, 64 on the basis of three fundamental policy concerns. First, allowing indirect purchasers to recover would create a "serious risk of multiple liability for defendants," given that the rule in Hanover Shoe would let the direct purchaser sue as well. 65 Second, calculating the distribution of the overcharge through the supply chain would overly complicate "already protracted treble-damages proceedings." 66 68 In UtiliCorp, the defendants allegedly conspired to increase the price of gas supplied to utility companies. 69 The utilities (the direct purchasers) then sold the gas to their customers (the indirect purchasers) in several states. 70 The states asserted parens patriae claims on behalf of those customers. 71 The Court held that the plaintiffs lacked standing; the plaintiffs' claims implicated the same policy concerns as those emphasized in Illinois Brick because the plaintiff states represented indirect purchasers. 72 The Court soundly rejected the idea of creating marketbased exceptions to the direct purchaser rule.
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Although the UtiliCorp Court declined to create a new exception, Illinois Brick explicitly mentioned two exceptions: the cost-plus contracts exception and the own-or-control exception. 74 The cost-plus exception established by Hanover Shoe and confirmed by Illinois Brick allows indirect purchasers to sue when there is a pre-existing cost-plus contract between the direct and indirect purchasers.
75 A cost-plus contract fixes the quantity of sales so the direct purchaser is "insulated from any decrease in its sales as a result of attempting to pass on the overcharge," simplifying the apportionment of damages.
76 UtiliCorp described this exception as applying to situations in which "market forces" are suspended.
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A second exception mentioned in Illinois Brick allows the pass-on theory to be used "where the direct purchaser is owned or controlled by its customer."
78 When the indirect purchaser and the direct purchaser act as a single entity, courts grant indirect purchasers standing because it preserves "an undiluted incentive in the hands of the most likely enforcer" of the antitrust laws. 79 If an employee directly purchases an overcharged product and is subsequently reimbursed by her employer (the indirect purchaser), the direct 67. Ill. Brick, 431 U.S. at 735 ("[A]ntitrust laws will be more effectively enforced by concentrating the full recovery for the overcharge in the direct purchasers . . . .").
68 Other exceptions have arisen either from unquestioning judicial consensus or from the logical implications of the own-or-control exception. 81 Meanwhile, suits for injunctive relief and criminal charges fall outside of the purview of section 4 of the Clayton Act because they are not brought by parties seeking treble damages, thereby bypassing concerns about duplicative monetary recovery and complex damage calculations, since no damages are sought or awarded. 82 Outside of these well-established exceptions, the creation of a "new" exception is a rare occurrence. 83 This Note addresses whether and how these exceptions should apply in the FTAIA context.
B. The FTAIA: Interpretation and Controversy
The FTAIA sets a "general rule placing all (nonimport) activity involving foreign commerce outside" the reach of the antitrust laws, 84 and then makes an exception for when "the conduct both (1) sufficiently affects American commerce . . . and (2) has an effect of a kind that the antitrust law considers harmful, i.e., the effect must 'giv [ 83. See infra Part II for a discussion of the development and purposes of the "co-conspirator" exception. Foreign conduct falls within the Sherman Act when it involves import commerce or when it falls under the FTAIA's "effects exception." 87 As the FTAIA states, "[the Sherman Act] shall not apply to conduct involving trade or commerce (other than import trade or import commerce) with foreign nations." 88 This import exception applies "when a foreign cartel fixes the price of goods sold directly to U.S. customers" 89 and when the antitrust violators "target import goods or services." 90 In addition to falling outside of the FTAIA's restrictions, the people and businesses in the United States that directly import the goods will also generally have standing under Illinois Brick as direct purchasers. When the conduct involves export or foreign commerce, the more complicated "effects exception" determines if the plaintiff's claim is reachable under the FTAIA and Sherman Act. 91 The effects exception requires a cognizable antitrust violation with "direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable" domestic effects (the "effects test"), and a plaintiff whose injury was caused by the domestic effects (the "causation element").
92
Congress designed the FTAIA to strike a balance between protecting commerce and consumers while "avoiding unreasonable interference with the regulation of foreign markets by other countries" in respect of comity. 93 In the FTAIA context, comity is "not the comity of courts, whereby judges decline to exercise jurisdiction over matters more appropriately adjudged elsewhere, but rather what might be termed 'prescriptive comity': the respect sovereign nations afford each other by limiting the reach of their laws." 94 In adjudicating FTAIA claims, courts may consider the goodwill and respect concerns implicated by international comity. 95 Perhaps they should-applying antitrust laws to foreign conduct risks "interfere[nce] with a foreign nation's ability independently to regulate its own commercial affairs." 96 99 Considering that foreign governments may benefit from cartels based in their own countries that export the price-fixed goods, they "often have no incentive" to punish such antitrust activity.
100 Courts do, however, still consider comity when interpreting and applying the FTAIA.
101
The FTAIA generally avoids implicating comity concerns by requiring that foreign antitrust activity create "direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect[s]" on American commerce in order to fall within the Sherman Act.
102 There are currently two interpretations of the requirement that the effects be "direct" under the FTAIA: the Ninth Circuit's immediate consequence test, and the competing "reasonably proximate causal nexus" interpretation. 103 These interpretations have significant ramifications for private individuals suing for treble damages and the Department of Justice (DOJ) bringing injunctive and criminal charges. 104 The inquiries into substantiality and reasonable foreseeability are separate from directness; effects can be direct and still fail the substantiality or reasonable foreseeability prongs. Although federal circuit courts have not explicitly disagreed about what makes an effect "substantial," they have also not offered any definite tests.
105 Substantiality may require injuries to a market rather than to individuals, or it may be indicated by the monetary size of the injury. 106 The DOJ has, for example, used the volume of sales that were impacted to determine substantiality: "billions of dollars of affected commerce" would be enough to show 110 The plaintiff claimed that it should be permitted to sue under the FTAIA's effects exception because (1) the foreign anticompetitive conduct satisfied the effects test, and (2) the substantial effects in the United States gave rise to a claim under the Sherman Act.
111 This interpretation would have permitted the plaintiff to sue using the effects exception to the FTAIA even though it was not injured by the effects in the United States. In Empagran I, however, the Court held that " 'gives rise to a claim' means 'gives rise to the plaintiff's claim.' " 112 The Court based its decision on the premise that "Congress would not have intended the FTAIA's exception to bring independently caused foreign injury within the Sherman Act's reach."
113 This interpretation limited the scope of the FTAIA to claims that were sufficiently related to adverse effects on American commerce, taking into account the importance of "comity and history."
114 Every circuit court that has considered cases after Empagran I has decided that the domestic effects must proximately cause the plaintiff's injury.
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When foreign direct purchasers fail Empagran I's causation test, American indirect purchasers could still theoretically qualify to bring suit under the FTAIA's effects exception. 116 The direct purchaser rule may stand in their way, however. 117 The remainder of this Note argues that exceptions to the direct purchaser rule that satisfy all the policy concerns of Illinois Brick should apply with equal force in both domestic and international cases. 
II. Controllers, Co-Conspirators, and Calming
Illinois Brick Concerns
In the hypothetical at the start of this Note,
This Part focuses on the exceptions permitting indirect purchasers to sue when (1) the direct purchaser is a co-conspirator (the "co-conspirator exception"), or (2) the direct purchaser is owned or controlled by the antitrust violator (the "defendant control exception"). 119 Essentially, this Note argues that the defendant control and the co-conspirator exceptions should be considered equal to the exceptions explicitly mentioned in Illinois Brickthe traditional own-or-control exception and the cost-plus exceptionwhen determining which should apply in the FTAIA context. 120 The defendant control and co-conspirator exceptions have particular relevance in the FTAIA context. Ordinarily, foreign antitrust violators that sell products directly into the United States are subject to U.S. antitrust laws under either the FTAIA's import commerce exception or effects exception (because they satisfy Illinois Brick). 121 Foreign antitrust violators that target American consumers should not be able to get around this liability simply by conspiring with (or commanding) foreign direct purchases to act as intermediaries. One way to close this loophole is to recognize the defendant control and coconspirator exceptions in the FTAIA context. Section II.A analyzes the development and distinctive features of the defendant control and co-conspirator exceptions. Section II.B argues that these two exceptions arose because they satisfied Illinois Brick's concerns of prohibiting duplicative liability, encouraging efficient enforcement of the antitrust laws, and avoiding overly complex proceedings. All exceptions that satisfy these concerns should apply with equal force in the United States and in the FTAIA context.
A. Exceptional Definitions: Two as One
The Supreme Court has never officially recognized the defendant control exception or the co-conspirator exception. 122 from the intuitive notion that when the direct purchaser conspires with (or is owned or controlled by) the antitrust violator, the so-called "indirect" purchaser is really buying directly from a single conspiring entity made up of the direct purchaser and the original violator. 123 These are persuasive and intuitive exceptions that should be recognized as authoritative and should apply in the FTAIA context.
Within three years of Illinois Brick, at least two circuits recognized that the "own-or-control" exception should apply when the antitrust violators control the direct purchasers, creating the defendant control exception. 124 The original own-or-control exception applies when the direct and indirect purchasers function as one entity, and the defendant control exception applies when the direct purchaser and the supplier function as one entity. When applying the own-or-control exception, "the unanimous view is that the exception applies not only where the direct purchaser is owned or controlled by its customer, but also where it is owned or controlled by its supplier."
125 This exception is different from the co-conspirator exception, 126 but similarly permits indirect purchasers to sue when "there is no realistic possibility that the direct purchaser will sue its supplier over the antitrust violation." The "more contentious" co-conspirator exception 128 comes in two forms. The indirect purchaser can sue the co-conspirators in either a traditional horizontal conspiracy or, relevant here, in a vertical conspiracy.
129 A vertical conspiracy is one in which the two sides of a conspiracy "operate at different levels of production or distribution," such as a supplier and its customer. 130 The vertical co-conspirator exception "is not really an exception at all" because "[i]f the direct purchaser conspires to fix the price paid by the plaintiffs, then the plaintiffs pay the fixed price directly and are not indirect 
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Since then, many courts have held that the alleged co-conspirator must be named and joined in the lawsuit for the exception to apply, in order to reduce the risk of duplicative recovery. 133 If both co-conspirators were not joined, then "inconsistent adjudications on the existence of a vertical conspiracy would enable both indirect purchasers and middlemen to recover for a single overcharge."
B. Exceptional Policies: Applying Illinois Brick
The Court recognized two explicit exceptions in Hanover Shoe and Illinois Brick (the cost-plus and own-or-control exceptions) because they satisfied the three policy concerns implicated when indirect purchasers are permitted to sue for treble damages in antitrust lawsuits. 135 When applying or creating any exception to Illinois Brick, courts usually reference more than one of these policy reasons and often discuss all three: prohibiting duplicative liability, encouraging efficient enforcement of the antitrust laws, and avoiding overly complex proceedings. 136 The defendant control and co-conspirator exceptions are no different. U.S. courts applying the defendant control and co-conspirator exceptions justify their application by reference to the policy considerations in Illinois Brick. 137 widely apply these exceptions, the Supreme Court has never explicitly considered them. 138 This Section explains why these exceptions nevertheless assuage the Supreme Court's concerns from Illinois Brick.
First, both the defendant control and co-conspirator exceptions are intended to avoid liability of multiple defendants for treble damages, one of the primary policy concerns of Illinois Brick. 139 The defendant control exception and co-conspirator exception leave a small possibility that the controlled direct purchaser or co-conspirator will eventually bring a suit against the supplier, although many courts have argued that the multiple recovery consideration is fully addressed in the co-conspirator exception. 140 In Royal Printing Co. v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., the Ninth Circuit admitted that there would be a chance of duplicative recovery under the co-conspirator exception but was not overly concerned because it was unlikely. 141 In applying these exceptions, courts have taken steps to minimize the chances for duplicative recovery. For example, courts have held that clear ownership in the form of a subsidiary relationship or clear actual control as indicated by credit or stock arrangements are the only acceptable circumstances in which to invoke the defendant control exception, 142 and many have required the conspiring direct purchaser to be joined as a defendant before applying the co-conspirator exception. 143 Joining the co-conspirator (direct purchaser) as a defendant prevents the direct purchaser from bringing a separate suit to try to clear its name and recover damages later on.
The co-conspirator and the defendant control exceptions are most effective at encouraging the efficient enforcement of antitrust laws. If there is little chance of duplicative recovery because the direct purchaser is unlikely to sue, then there is also the chance that "barring [the indirect purchaser's] suit would close off every avenue for private enforcement of the antitrust laws in such cases," which would be "intolerable."
144 Without the defendant control and co-conspirator exceptions, antitrust violators could avoid liability by creating a subsidiary or otherwise controlled "middleman" to take the fall for them, thereby preventing indirect purchasers from bringing suit. These subsidiaries or co-conspirators would not be inclined to bring antitrust actions against their controllers or conspirators, thereby insulating those that would otherwise be held liable for antitrust violations. Both the defendant control exception and the co-conspirator exception generally avoid the problems associated with overly complex "incidence analysis"
146 -or tracing the path of the overcharge-that is, determining how much of the overcharge was passed on through the distribution chain. In both instances, because the direct purchaser and the antitrust violator are acting as one entity, it should be easy to show that the entire overcharge was passed to the indirect purchaser. In co-conspirator cases, the price has been preset so the co-conspirator does not incur additional supply-and-demand costs from passing on the costs to customers. 147 This means that the calculations for apportionment are simple: the non-conspirator is the only party that has suffered harm and the pass-on theory is inapplicable. In cases in which the middleman is owned or controlled by the initial seller, the same is likely to be true.
Although satisfying all three Illinois Brick considerations is important for a viable exception, avoiding overly complex antitrust proceedings is vital. Illinois Brick suggests that avoiding complexity is the most important consideration: even if all parties could be joined to eliminate duplicative recoveries, "the complexity thereby introduced into treble-damages proceedings argues strongly for retaining the Hanover Shoe rule."
148 Accordingly, avoiding complex apportionment is "the most persuasive" 149 policy consideration. Based on an analysis of the various exceptions, avoiding complex apportionment may be possible only when two of the parties act as a single entity or when there is a clear cost-plus contract explicitly demonstrating that the direct purchaser did not suffer any losses from lost sales.
Since Illinois Brick, the Supreme Court and several circuit courts have declined to create new or expanded exceptions to the direct purchaser rule, particularly when an exception would unduly complicate proceedings and apportionment. 150 Even if an exception aligns with the Illinois Brick policies, UtiliCorp makes clear that although the "economic assumptions underlying the Illinois Brick rule might be disproved in a specific case," it is an "unwarranted and counterproductive exercise to litigate a series of exceptions." 150. See e.g., Kansas v. UtiliCorp United Inc., 497 U.S. 199, 210 (1990) ("If we were to add indirect purchasers to the action, we would have to devise an apportionment formula. This is the very complexity that Hanover Shoe and Illinois Brick sought to avoid."); Gulfstream III Assocs., Inc. v. Gulfstream Aerospace Corp., 995 F.2d 425, 439-40 (3d Cir. 1993) (declining to expand an exception because of complexities in apportioning losses).
151. UtiliCorp, 497 U.S. at 217.
[Vol. 114:309 Courts have, however, interpreted Illinois Brick's exceptions to be nonexclusive. 152 The dissenting opinion in UtiliCorp advocates for creating an exception in cases in which the policy rationales of Illinois Brick are satisfied.
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The defendant control exception and the co-conspirator exception are relatively well-established and satisfy the policy rationales of Illinois Brick. Accordingly, like the exceptions mentioned in Illinois Brick, they should apply with equal force to domestic and international anticompetitive conduct.
III. The Application of Illinois Brick Exceptions
Under the FTAIA Although the FTAIA does not mention the direct purchaser rule, it seems clear that the basic Illinois Brick rule applies in the FTAIA context. 154 The question remains, however, whether and how the exceptions to the Illinois Brick doctrine may apply. Section III.A advocates for interpreting "direct" effects under the FTAIA to require a reasonably proximate causal nexus, particularly given that standard's effects on the criminal deterrence of foreign cartels. Section III.B analyzes the recent Motorola Mobility LLC v. AU Optronics Corp. decision. Section III.C concludes that, because the policy concerns are not fundamentally different when the direct purchaser happens to be located overseas, the exceptions that satisfy all of Illinois Brick's concerns should be applied with equal force when there is a foreign direct purchaser in the FTAIA context.
A. "Directly" Interpreting the FTAIA
In interpreting "direct" under the FTAIA, the Ninth Circuit required that direct effects "follow[ ] as an immediate consequence" of anticompetitive conduct, meaning only direct purchasers can experience direct effects under the FTAIA. 155 This parallelism has tempted several courts. 156 The Seventh and Second Circuits, however, have opted for the more flexible "reasonably proximate causal nexus" interpretation of "direct."
157 Under this standard, causal connections that are "so attenuated that the consequence is more aptly described as mere fortuity" would be indirect. 158 Applying this analysis, it is possible for an indirect purchaser to suffer direct effects. 159 This interpretation would therefore permit indirect purchasers to have standing to sue under the FTAIA, assuming that they can get around Illinois Brick. This test is similar to a proximate cause analysis; it can involve inquiring into the natural and probable consequences of an act, the scope of the risk of the anticompetitive activity, or whether there was a superseding cause. 160 Under the direct means direct theory of the FTAIA, antitrust claims would be impossible "for [the] price fixing of products [first] sold abroad, no matter how massively and predictably U.S. consumers were harmed." 161 This interpretation could have disastrous effects, however, because the FTAIA applies equally to private civil cases and the criminal prosecution of international cartels. 162 Normally, because Illinois Brick applies only to suits brought for treble damages under the Clayton Act, the DOJ has no standing issues. This definition, however, would create one by tying the direct purchaser doctrine to the FTAIA requirement for direct effects. 163 If the FTAIA limits direct effects to first purchasers, the DOJ would be powerless against foreign anticompetitive conduct that had a substantial effect on American indirect purchasers. 164 Although the Supreme Court has not considered the extent of DOJ jurisdiction in international cases, the First Circuit has held that the DOJ may prosecute foreign entities when their activities have a "substantial and intended effect within the United States," mirroring the FTAIA. 165 Also, the Ninth Circuit's requirement that direct effects "follow[ ] as an immediate consequence" of anticompetitive conduct 166 seems to exclude any indirect purchaser claims and, perhaps, related DOJ claims because it would mean that two steps removed from the initial source might be too remote. No other circuits have followed this standard. This Section argues for a more flexible definition of "direct" in direct effects-one that is different from the definition in direct purchaser. [Vol. 114:309 Courts should interpret "direct" in the FTAIA as requiring only "a reasonably proximate causal nexus" to the anticompetitive activity. 167 The text of the statute, its purpose, and the practical impact on the DOJ favor the reasonably proximate causal nexus standard.
The reasonably proximate causal nexus standard is a better textual understanding of the FTAIA because it "gives effect" to all parts of the statute and accordingly avoids rendering much of the FTAIA superfluous. 168 The statutory interpretation rule against surplusage arises out of a court's "duty to give effect, where possible, to every word of a statute." 169 To interpret "direct" to mean "immediate" would violate the rule against surplusage in two ways. First, "[r]eading 'direct' as 'immediate' would rob the separate 'reasonabl[e] foreseeab[ility]' requirement of any meaningful function, since [it is difficult] . . . to imagine any domestic effect that would be both 'immediate' and 'substantial' but not 'reasonably foreseeable.' " 170 Second, demanding an " 'immediate' consequence on import or domestic commerce comes close to ignoring the fact that straightforward import commerce has already been excluded from the FTAIA's coverage." 171 It would make the import exception "superfluous[ ] . . . or insignificant" since it already covers the instances in which Americans are the direct purchasers. 172 "Superimposing the idea of 'immediate consequence' on top of the full phrase results in a stricter test than the complete text of the statute can bear." 173 Although unified definitions of "direct" in the two contexts are appealing, the definitions may diverge for several reasons. Arguably, because they are both used in the same area of the law, they should be interpreted with the same meaning by analogy to the tendency of courts to read different related statutes as if they were one law (in pari materia). This canon of statutory interpretation reflects the assumption that "a legislative body generally uses a particular word with a consistent meaning in a given context" across various statutes. 174 That analogy, however, overlooks the key fact that the direct purchaser rule is not a statute. It is a common law doctrine developed by the Supreme Court before the passage of the FTAIA. Although Congress was presumably aware of Illinois Brick, 175 Congress's complete failure to mention the direct purchaser rule in the text of the FTAIA indicates that it may not have been thinking of the potential dual meaning of "direct" in that context.
Additionally, the use of "direct" in each instance is fundamentally different. In "direct purchaser," "direct" refers to the relationship between the purchaser and the seller, not the relationship between the injury and the anticompetitive conduct. Although "remote" can be used to describe either effects with loose causal connections or the distance of several degrees, "remote" need not have the same meaning in both instances. Merely traveling through one additional link in the distribution chain, absent other considerations, should not transform direct causal effects into indirect ones. 176 In a price-fixing scenario, it is difficult to imagine a complete pass on of an overcharge from the direct purchaser to the indirect purchaser resulting in anything other than a direct effect. 177 Even when the price fixing occurs on a component part, it could still cause "significant harm in the downstream consumer markets."
178 Even Illinois Brick recognizes that preventing indirect purchasers from suing will deny recovery to indirect purchasers who may have been "actually injured by antitrust violations." 179 Being actually injured by something indicates direct causation. There is "nothing inherent in the nature of . . . international supply chains" that would "render any and all domestic effects impermissibly remote and indirect." 180 Given that there are two distinct definitions of "direct" in the dictionary, Congress could easily have applied one in the FTAIA context, while the Court applied the other in developing the direct purchaser rule. Webster's Third New International Dictionary defines "direct" as both (1) "proceeding from one point to another in time or space without deviation or interruption," and (2) "characterized by or giving evidence of a close especially logical, causal, or consequential relationship." 181 The The second definition "is more consistent with the language of the statute" and "addresses the classic concern about remoteness" through a proximate cause analysis and should be adopted for the FTAIA's effects exception. 184 Congressional intent also indicates that courts should not interpret the statute so narrowly. Although Congress recognized that the FTAIA implicated international comity concerns, "Congress' foremost concern in passing the antitrust laws was the protection of Americans." 185 James Atwood, former deputy legal advisor of the U.S. Department of State, informed Congress that "it is simply too important from the standpoint of American interests" to abandon the enforcement of U.S. antitrust laws when there are adverse effects within the United States. 186 The FTAIA was "not intended to restrict the application of American laws to extraterritorial conduct where the requisite effects exist." 187 Additionally, Congress meant to "preserve[ ] antitrust protections in the domestic marketplace for all purchasers." 188 Substantial and predictable anticompetitive effects on American markets are adverse whether they occur to direct or indirect purchasers, and limiting the definition of direct would undermine the purpose of the FTAIA to balance these concerns. 189 Interpreting "direct" to apply only to purchases by direct purchasers in the United States "risks constraining the government's ability to prosecute offshore component price fixing that threatens massive harm to U.S. commerce and consumers." 190 In the modern world, this would make the American marketplace unacceptably vulnerable to exploitation. 191 It is not difficult to imagine a situation in which an overseas price fixer increases prices for its direct purchaser (also overseas), who then passes on the entire amount to consumers in the United States. In such a case, the overseas direct purchaser might fail to show that substantial, reasonably foreseeable effects on American commerce gave rise to its claim, precluding it from suing under the FTAIA. 192 In this situation, even if indirect purchasers are not permitted to bring suit under Illinois Brick, the DOJ should still be able to prosecute anticompetitive conduct overseas given the importance of maintaining cartel deterrence. 193 Additionally, the concerns with comity that arise in the context of the FTAIA do not apply with equal force to the DOJ. 194 Through prosecutorial discretion, " [t] he United States carefully considers international comity and exercises prudence before bringing any antitrust enforcement actions that might implicate the interests of a foreign jurisdiction." 195 Private plaintiffs, meanwhile, are not generally trusted to carefully weigh deference to foreign governments when determining whether to sue for civil damages. 196 To ensure that DOJ can continue to deter criminal antitrust conduct overseas in compliance with the FTAIA, it is necessary to avoid adopting the "direct means direct" understanding of Illinois Brick and antitrust standing requirements.
Interpreting "direct" to require a reasonably causal nexus will not cause all foreign conduct to be swept into the FTAIA's effects exception. First, it will not always be possible to establish substantial and reasonably foreseeable effects when foreign-produced, antitrust-violating components are built into finished products sold in the United States. In some situations there may be so many degrees of separation that the connection between the price fixing and the domestic effect is "highly attenuated, insignificant, or unpredictable"-but just one additional step in the distribution chain should not necessarily yield that result. 197 Still, it is possible that there could be a "close, significant, and predictable causal connection" between a "major component made and sold" in foreign commerce and finished products in American commerce; indirect purchasers should not be unilaterally excluded from the effects exception. 198 The "gives rise to" prong of the effects exception under Empagran I also substantially limits the breadth of the exception: all independently caused foreign harm will fall outside of the scope of the antitrust laws. "The direct effect requirement helps ensure that the [antitrust laws are] not used to police anticompetitive conduct whose impact, as a practical matter, is limited to foreign markets and, thus, is best addressed by foreign nations." 199 Finally, courts are also free to invoke the principle of comity to deny standing. 200 [Vol. 114:309
B. Interpreting Motorola II: Comity and Implications
In November 2014, the Seventh Circuit held that Motorola could not bring a section 4 Clayton Act claim against foreign cell phone screen manufacturers that had allegedly sold price-fixed screens to Motorola subsidiaries overseas. 201 The court assumed arguendo that there had been direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effects on American commerce, and proceeded to find that the effects did not give rise to Motorola's claims on behalf of its subsidiaries. 202 Motorola II may be the first case of its kind to directly tackle the issues raised by the direct purchaser rule and the FTAIA. Although the Seventh Circuit seemed to reject the application of the ownor-control exception when the case fell under the FTAIA, 203 this Section differentiates Motorola II from a true example of the own-or-control exception, and concludes that traditional exceptions to Illinois Brick should still apply when the requirements of the FTAIA's effects exception are met.
Although the Motorola II court discussed the own-or-control exception, the facts of the case did not satisfy the reasons for the own-or-control exception. The own-or-control exception is meant to apply to cases in which the owner or controller of the direct purchaser specifically reimbursed the exact amount to its subsidiary. In Motorola II, the relationship between Motorola and its subsidiaries was not so clear cut. The Seventh Circuit examined the footnote from Illinois Brick creating the own-or-control exception-noting that because the Court said only that there "might be" an exception, the Seventh Circuit was at liberty not to apply one in that case. 204 Judge Posner, writing for the court, explained that even if he were to hypothetically apply the own-or-control exception and treat Motorola as "one" with its subsidiaries, Motorola would still fail under the second prong of the effects test.
A true own-or-control example might pass muster under Motorola II. If, instead of some nebulous relationship with its subsidiaries, Motorola had simply sent an agent to China to purchase its screens, and then, upon that agent's return to the United States, paid her for her entire expenditure, it seems likely the exception would apply. Assuming a direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect on American commerce, the injury to Motorola would have been a part of that anticompetitive effect in the United States or perhaps considered as import commerce and therefore exempt from the FTAIA altogether.
The Seventh Circuit failed to set broader rules for when and how courts should apply the exceptions to Illinois Brick, but left room for them to apply the exceptions in the FTAIA context. First, Motorola II's comity concerns, even if valid, would not apply in most situations implicating Illinois Brick exceptions. The court stated that because the direct purchasers were incorporated and regulated under foreign law, comity principles prevented American courts from interfering and demanded that such direct purchasers seek redress in their countries of incorporation. 208 This, however, was a problem in Motorola II mainly because Motorola seemed to be suing on its subsidiaries' behalf and not for the amount it overpaid in the United States.
209 Such comity principles would probably not apply if the indirect purchaser had evidence of its own harm, thus demonstrating an injury that occurred in the United States rather than abroad and satisfying the effects exception under the FTAIA. Similarly, if the foreign direct purchaser were owned or controlled by, or co-conspirators with, the price fixer (instead of its customer, as in Motorola II), the court's specific comity analysis would not apply since the American customer might not have had easy access to the foreign antitrust enforcement system.
Properly understood, exceptions to the direct purchaser rule do not infringe on comity by expanding the reach of the FTAIA. Parties overseas who incurred injuries independent of (or prior to) effects on American commerce will still be prevented from suing by Empagran I and the second prong of the effects exception. The federal courts should create a rule that allows all of the exceptions to the direct purchaser rule to apply to the FTAIA. This would decrease the probability that international cartels would be able to conspire with impunity to reach American consumers through foreign subsidiaries (defendant control) or co-conspirators. The rule would also capture cases in which, although technically indirect purchasers, American companies have bought at fixed prices from agents whom they control.
Although Motorola II rejected a broad exception to Illinois Brick when "applying the doctrine would prevent any American company from suing," the case is best understood as holding that Motorola did not meet the second prong of the FTAIA effects exception because it did not show that the effects on domestic commerce actually injured it. 210 Therefore, in cases in which an Illinois Brick exception is actually satisfied, Motorola II still permits American indirect purchasers to sue when they can show the requisite effects gave rise to their claims.
C. International Policy: Justifying Exceptions
Applying the exceptions to the direct purchaser rule (such as the coconspirator and defendant control exceptions) in the FTAIA context reaps the same benefits as the generic Illinois Brick exceptions: apportionment of damages is simplified, the risk of multiple recovery is reduced significantly, and American consumers are encouraged to engage in active and efficient enforcement of U.S. antitrust laws.
First, exceptions to the direct purchaser rule should apply in the FTAIA context because they will not complicate damages calculations any more than they would in the domestic context. Even assuming international antitrust cases are more complex than domestic cases, the FTAIA explicitly sweeps international conduct into the clutches of the antitrust laws when plaintiffs satisfy the effects exception. 211 In the domestic context, Illinois Brick is concerned that permitting indirect purchasers to sue will "greatly complicate and reduce the effectiveness of already protracted" legal proceedings. 212 Applying exceptions such as the defendant control and co-conspirator exceptions, however, should avoid complicating the process by treating the direct purchaser and antitrust violator as one entity. 213 Because these exceptions to the direct purchaser rule do not further complicate antitrust cases, they are valid in the international context and, therefore, indirect purchasers should be permitted to sue in such cases.
Permitting indirect purchasers to sue under Illinois Brick exceptions also encourages the efficient enforcement of the antitrust laws while avoiding duplicative recovery. In the FTAIA context, duplicative recovery has two sides, international and domestic. In the international context, there is no foolproof way to avoid all overlap between judgments in foreign countries for direct purchasers and judgments in the United States for indirect purchasers. For several reasons, this potential overlap is not overly concerning. First, Illinois Brick and Hanover Shoe were especially concerned with duplicative private damages awards, 214 but most foreign countries do not allow any private damages for antitrust violations. 215 Even if a foreign state did permit private antitrust damages, the exceptions to Illinois Brick should allow indirect purchasers to sue only when it would be unlikely for the direct purchaser to bring suit. 216 Finally, if direct purchasers are owned by or conspiring with antitrust violators, it seems unlikely that foreign courts would believe they were truly harmed and award them damages.
Precisely because direct purchasers are very unlikely to sue if they are co-conspirators or owned by the antitrust violator, there is also little danger of duplicative recovery in the United States, which is "[a] primary consideration of the courts in deciding whether or not to carve an exception to Illinois Brick." 217 Foreign direct purchasers may also have difficulty demonstrating that the injury in the United States gave rise to their claim under the FTAIA-perhaps precluding them from suing in the United States altogether and preventing duplicative recovery. Even if duplicative recovery in the United States were possible, courts could require safeguards similar to those already limiting the co-conspirator exception. For example, the application of the exception could be limited to instances in which the direct purchaser can be joined, like the co-conspirator exception, 218 or instances in which the direct purchaser has already been denied standing under the FTAIA's causation element through a binding judgment.
If direct purchasers are unlikely to sue because they fall into the scope of one of the exceptions, then permitting indirect purchasers to sue under the FTAIA would also further the goal of enforcing the antitrust laws through private plaintiffs. The threat of treble damages in the United States might have the valuable impact of deterring foreign anticompetitive conduct that reaches the United States. Although the FTAIA was meant to limit the scope of the antitrust laws 219 -and thereby limit the number of individuals qualified to sue for treble damages under section 4 of the Clayton Act-a reasonable Congress would not have intended to create a loophole for conspiring international entities. Illinois Brick "was concerned not merely that direct purchasers have sufficient incentive to bring suit . . . but rather that at least some party have sufficient incentive to bring suit." 220 When the requirements for the Illinois Brick exceptions are met, the only individuals with incentives and standing to bring civil suits may be American indirect purchasers.
Whether the defendant violated U.S. antitrust laws abroad or domestically, the exceptions to Illinois Brick discussed in this Note are equally valid and effective. These exceptions avoid overly complicating the apportionment of damages, prevent duplicative recovery, and encourage the enforcement of [Vol. 114:309 the antitrust laws. Accordingly, courts should apply them with equal force in both the domestic and the FTAIA contexts.
Conclusion
American consumers suffering direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effects of anticompetitive activity are "those individuals whose protection is the fundamental purpose of the antitrust laws." 221 Illinois Brick recognized the limits of this stance by admitting that actual harm to indirect purchasers in the United States would go unaddressed because of the direct purchaser rule. 222 Still, the Supreme Court deemed deterrence and judicial efficiency best served by having direct purchasers sue. 223 Many states, scholars, and even Congress have criticized this rule, although neither Congress nor the Court has ever overturned it. 224 The policies in Illinois Brick control, and they do not appear to be changing.
225 Accordingly, the courts will have to grapple with them in the FTAIA context.
In the domestic context, the traditional exceptions to Illinois Brick and the defendant control and co-conspirator exceptions are widely considered to satisfy the Illinois Brick policy concerns. In the FTAIA context, these exceptions should still apply. The policy concerns are comparable, and the result avoids a significant civil loophole for international cartels. Sooner or later, the Supreme Court will grant a petition for a writ of certiorari to clarify these rules and the application of the FTAIA. 226 When the case arises, the Supreme Court should clarify that the traditional exceptions, the defendant control exception, and the co-conspirator exception to the direct purchaser rule will apply to FTAIA cases that satisfy the policy considerations of Illinois Brick.
